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Abstract
Scientific fields such as insider-threat detec-
tion and highway-safety planning often lack
sufficient amounts of time-series data to esti-
mate statistical models for the purpose of sci-
entific discovery. Moreover, the available lim-
ited data are quite noisy. This presents a major
challenge when estimating time-series models
that are robust to overfitting and have well-
calibrated uncertainty estimates. Most of the
current literature in these fields involve visu-
alizing the time-series for noticeable structure
and hard coding them into pre-specified para-
metric functions. This approach is associated
with two limitations. First, given that such
trends may not be easily noticeable in small
data, it is difficult to explicitly incorporate ex-
pressive structure into the models during for-
mulation. Second, it is difficult to know a
priori the most appropriate functional form to
use. To address these limitations, a nonpara-
metric Bayesian approach was proposed to im-
plicitly capture hidden structure from time se-
ries having limited data. The proposed model,
a Gaussian process with a spectral mixture ker-
nel, precludes the need to pre-specify a func-
tional form and hard code trends, is robust to
overfitting and has well-calibrated uncertainty
estimates.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modeling expressive structure in time-series data is a vi-
tal requirement in several scientific fields including cy-
ber security, insider-threat detection, and highway-safety
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planning for the purpose of scientific discovery. Chief
risk officers (CRO) in large corporations and government
agencies are tasked with forecasting potential risks to
company assets by malicious employees or contractors.
Departments of Transportation (DOTs) are mandated by
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to forecast
highway crashes as part of their strategic highway safety
plans (SHSPs) in order to obtain funding (Smith, 2016).
However, these fields often lack sufficient amounts of
training data to accurately capture the signal of the phe-
nomenon under study and consequently discover hidden
patterns. For instance Greitzer and Ferryman (2013)
state that ”ground truth” data on actual insider behav-
ior is typically either not available or is limited. In some
cases, one might acquire real data, but for privacy rea-
sons, there is no attribution of any individuals relating to
abuses or offensesi.e., there is no ground truth. The data
may contain insider threats, but these are not identified
or knowable to the researcher (Greitzer and Ferryman,
2013; Gheyas and Abdallah, 2016). In highway-safety
planning, Veeramisti (2016) mentions that Departments
of Transportation (DOTs) only recently started collect-
ing monthly highway-crash data because of the high cost
and extensive process of collecting the required data.
1.1 INSIDER THREAT
Insider threats are malicious acts carried out by current
or former employees or trusted partners of an organiza-
tion who abuse their authorized access to an organiza-
tion’s networks, systems, and/or data (Glasser and Lin-
dauer, 2013; Lindauer et al., 2014). Insider threats in-
clude but not limited to, theft of intellectual property or
national security information, fraud, and sabotage. Many
government, academic, and industry groups seek to dis-
cover and develop solutions to detect and protect against
these insider threats. However, the difficulty of obtain-
ing suitable data for research, development, and test-
ing remains a significant hinderance (Glasser and Lin-
dauer, 2013). This is attributed to two major factors.
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First, confidentiality and privacy concerns create barri-
ers to the collection and use of such data for research
purposes. To collect real data, some organization must
directly monitor and record the behavior and actions of
its own employees. Second, insider threats are black
swan events that are very rare and only collected after the
fact (Gheyas and Abdallah, 2016). Nonetheless, some
studies have proposed methods for time-series analysis.
For example, Stoffel et al. (2013) proposed a Fourier
and wavelet model, to estimate a time-series model for
internet-traffic data from a computer network of work-
stations and servers.
1.2 HIGHWAY SAFETY
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) requires
state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) to develop
Highway Safety Plans (SHSPs) to obtain funding as part
of the two legislative acts (Smith, 2016). State Depart-
ments of Transportation (DOTs) in the United States are
tasked with making reasonable predictions of highway
crashes on roadways based on historical data. This is
so as to set realistic targets for performance-based safety
programs to reduce fatalities and serious injuries. For a
traffic safety policy, a model-based approach generally is
avoided for forecasting and setting targets (Veeramisti,
2016). This is because the required data collection is
extensive and expensive; in addition, establishing a re-
lationship between the performance measures and influ-
encing factors is difficult (Kweon and Lim, 2012). For
example, in order to use a model-based approach, the Av-
erage Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) is one of the expo-
sure variables that is required for all public roads. Most
DOTs only collect the corresponding data for a sample
of their facilities (Veeramisti, 2016). Nonetheless, some
studies have proposed model-based methods for time-
series analysis. For example, Veeramisti (2016) pro-
posed a stochastic time series model, a seasonal auto-
regressive integrated moving average (sARIMA) model,
to forecast performance measures for performance-based
safety programs for the Nevada DOT. Other studies have
proposed different variations of ARIMA for crash fore-
casting (Yannis et al., 2011; Sukhai et al., 2011). These
targets can be used to determine future statewide safety
improvement programs and policies. From the perspec-
tive of state agencies, predicting the number of fatalities
and serious injuries is significantly important to meet the
requirements of MAP-21 (Smith, 2016).
1.3 LIMITATIONS AND RESEARCH
QUESTION
Current methods for time-series modeling for insider-
threat detection and highway-safety planning (described
in sections 1.1 and 1.2) are associated with two major
limitations. First, the methods involve visualizing the
time series for noticeable structure and patterns such as
periodicity, smoothness, growing/decreasing trends and
then hard coding these patterns into the statistical models
during formulation. This approach is suitable for large
datasets where more data typically provides more infor-
mation to learn expressive structure (Wilson, 2014). That
is, an analyst is able to look at the data, recognize trends
(i.e. periodicity, seasonal variation with possible de-
cay away from periodicity, long-term rising/decreasing
trends, medium-term irregularities, short seasonal varia-
tions, and noise), and then hard code those patterns into
statistical algorithms such as ARIMA to represent each
of these patterns. The limitation with this approach is
that all the pattern discovery is done by the analyst and
the resulting algorithm is used simply as a smoothing
tool. Given limited amounts of data, it is difficult to ex-
plicitly incorporate expressive prior information (such as
periodicity, smoothness, growing tends) into the statisti-
cal learning algorithms.
Second, most of the current literature focus on paramet-
ric models that impose strong restrictive assumptions by
pre-specifying the functional form and number of param-
eters (Veeramisti, 2016; Gheyas and Abdallah, 2016).
Pre-specifying a functional form for a time-series model
could lead to either overly complex model specifications
or simplistic models. It is difficult to know a priori the
most appropriate function to use for modeling sophisti-
cated insider-threat behavior and highway-crash occur-
rence that involve complex hidden patterns and many
other influencing factors. Due to a finite number of pa-
rameters, parametric models are not necessarily the best
to capture the entire structure of complex and sophis-
ticated processes (Ghahramani, 2015), such as insider-
threat behavior and highway-crash occurrence.
Given limited and noisy time-series data for insider-
threat detection and highway-safety planning, is it pos-
sible to perform: (1) pattern discovery without hard-
cording trends into statistical models during formulation,
and (2) model estimation that precludes pre-specifying a
functional form? To answer these two research questions
and address the above described limitations, this paper
proposed a nonparametric Bayesian framework which is
applied as an example to estimate two time series mod-
els: (1) the size of email attachments sent outside an
organization by insiders and (2) the annual number of
highway crashes in Nevada. The proposed framework
combines the flexibility of nonparametric Bayesian ap-
proaches (Williams and Rasmussen, 2006; Hjort et al.,
2010; Ghahramani, 2015) and kernels with more expres-
sive properties (Wilson and Adams, 2013; Duvenaud,
2014) than standard kernels proposed by Williams and
Rasmussen (2006). In particular, a flexible nonpara-
metric model – i.e., the Gaussian process (GP) model
– is proposed as a prior distribution for the unknown
regression functions, thereby precluding the need to
pre-specify a functional form. Flexibility is achieved
by making weaker assumptions about model structure,
thereby capturing the underlying behavior from data by
exploring an infinite dimensional space of possible func-
tions. Moreover, an expressive covariance – i.e., the
spectral mixture (SM) kernel (Wilson, 2014) – is pro-
posed as the covariance for the GP model thereby pre-
cluding the need to hard cord trends and consequently
allows to automatically discover hidden structure from
limited data. The SM kernel is particularly useful when
standard kernels such as the radial basis function fail to
capture functional structure (Schulz et al., 2017) in lim-
ited noisy data commonly found in insider-threat detec-
tion and highway-crash analysis. Recent advances in
computing and efficient sampling methods, such as the
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) (Hoffman and Gel-
man, 2014) enable fast inference in flexible models.
Moreover, a Bayesian modeling approach was used for
inference to quantify all uncertainty, using probability
distributions. The proposed GP-SM model maintained
the attractive interpretability properties of a standard GP
model; that is, the posterior mean and credible intervals
of the predicted series could be analyzed to visualize how
the response variable varies over time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the proposed methodology, including model
formulation and estimation using two efficient Bayesian
inference methods. Section 3 describes the experiments
performed including a description of the data used, the
sample formation processes, and empirical analyses. Fi-
nally, a conclusion that summarizes the important find-
ings from this study are presented in Section 4, including
recommendations for future research.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 MODEL FORMULATION
To formulate the methodology, consider for each data
point, i, that yi represents a response variable (such as
the attachment size in emails sent by an insider outside
the organization or number of highway crashes) and xi
is a temporal covariate such as year, month, week, or
day. Regression modeling can involve estimating a la-
tent function f , which maps input data, xi, to output data
yi for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where N is the total number of
data points. Each of the input data xi is of a single di-
mension D = 1, and X is a N x D matrix with rows xi.
The observations are assumed to satisfy:
yi = f(xi) + ε, where ε ∼ N (0, σ2ε) (1)
The noise term, ε, is assumed to be normally distributed
with a zero mean and variance, σ2ε . Latent function f rep-
resents hidden underlying trends that produced the ob-
served time-series data.
Given that it is difficult to know a priori the most appro-
priate functional form to use for f , a prior distribution,
p(f), over an infinite number of possible functions of
interest is formulated. A natural prior over an infinite
space of functions is a Gaussian process prior (Williams
and Rasmussen, 2006). Formally, a GP is defined as a
collection of random variables, f(xi), any finite subset
of which, f = {f(xi)}Ni=1, has a joint Gaussian distri-
bution, p(f | X) = N (f | m,KN,N ). The parameter m
denotes the mean function (or mean vector) which spec-
ifies the expected output of the function f given input X,
andKN,N denotes the covariance function (or covariance
matrix or kernel) which specifies the covariance between
outputs y = {(yi)}Ni=1. A GP is fully parameterized by a
mean function and covariance function, denoted as:
f ∼ GP(m,KN,N ), (2)
where each element in the mean vector and covariance
matrix is given by equation 3 and 4, respectively:
m(xi) = E[f(xi)], (3)
k(xi, xj) = E[(f(xi)−m(xi))(f(xj)−m(xj))T].
(4)
The kernel function, KN,N , is used to encode prior as-
sumptions of smoothness of functions such as periodic-
ity, rising or decreasing long-term and short-term trends
(Williams and Rasmussen, 2006). However, such prop-
erties may not be easily noticeable in time-series data
for insider-threat detection and highway-crash forecast-
ing. To address this limitation, a spectral mixture (SM)
kernel (Wilson, 2014; Wilson et al., 2015) was proposed
for the covariance function. The SM kernel is able to
implicitly capture structure by leveraging the idea that
any standard kernel can be expressed as an integral using
Bochners theorem, as illustrated below.
A standard stationary kernels is a functions of τ = xi −
xj ∈ Rp, then
k(τ) =
∫
RP
exp(2piisTτ)ψ(ds). (5)
If ψ has a density S(s), then S is the spectral density
of k; S and k are thus Fourier duals (Williams and Ras-
mussen (2006), see Appendix). This means that a spec-
tral density over the kernel space fully defines the kernel
and that furthermore every stationary kernel can be ex-
pressed as a spectral density. The spectral density mod-
eled with a single Gaussian can be expressed as:
φ(s, µ, σ2) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−(s−µ)
2/2σ2 (6)
The density S(s) is called the spectral density of k and
is given by:
S(s) =
1
2
[φ(s)− φ(−s)] (7)
The resulting kernel is given by:
k(τ) = exp(−2pi2τ2σ2) cos(2piτµ) (8)
The spectral density can be approximated by a mixture
of Q Gaussians (Wilson et al., 2015) as follows:
k(τ) =
Q∑
q=1
wq
P∏
p=1
exp(−2pi2τ2pυ2q ) cos(2piτpµ(p)q ),
(9)
where the qth component has mean vector
µq = (µ
(1)
q , ..., µ
(p)
q ) and a covariance matrix Mq
= diag(υ(1)q , ..., υ
(p)
q ). The inverse mean represents the
component periods and the inverse standard deviation
the length scales. The result is a flexible and expressive
parametrization of the kernel, in which complex kernels
are approximated by mixtures of simpler ones. The
reader is refereed to Wilson et al. (2015) for a more
detailed formulation of the SM kernel.
The likelihood of the response variable is a noisy sample
from the latent function expressed as:
p(y | f,X) = N (f, σ2ε). (10)
Given the GP prior in Equation (2) and the data likeli-
hood in Equation (10), the posterior distribution over the
unknown function evaluations f at all data points xi, was
estimated using Bayes theorem:
p(f | y,X) = p(y | f,X) p(f)
p(y | X) ,
=
p(y | f,X)N (f | m,KN,N )
p(y | X) ,
(11)
where:
p(f | y,X) = the posterior distribution of functions that
best explain the response variable, given the covariates
p(y | f,X) = the likelihood of response variable, given
the functions and covariates
p(f) = the prior over all possible functions of the
response variable
p(y | X) = the data (constant)
This posterior is a Gaussian process composed of a dis-
tribution of possible functions that best explain the time-
series pattern. Given that the data are fixed, equation (11)
was re-formulated as the unnormalized posterior distri-
bution
p(f | y,X) ∝ p(y | f,X)N (f | m,KN,N ). (12)
The posterior predictive distribution for a new input x?
conditional on observed data D = {yi, xi}Ni=1 is Gaus-
sian with mean and variance given by:
E[f(x? | D)] = kT? (KN,N + σ2I)−1y, (13)
V[f(x? | D)] = k(x?, x?)− kT? (KN,N + σ2I)−1k?.
(14)
where k? is the covariance between each observed input
and the new input x?.
2.2 MODEL ESTIMATION
Model estimation involved finding values for eighteen
hyperparameters, including nine frequency parameters
and nine lengthscale parameters. These hyperparame-
ters describe the distribution over functions rather than
the functions themselves. Bayesian inference, which was
adopted to estimate these hyperparameters, involved ex-
pressing prior beliefs over all the hyperparameters and
using probability theory to update those beliefs in light
of the observed data. In this approach, in contrast to
MLE, overfitting is of less concern because optimization
or the minimization of an error is not used for estimation
(McHutchon et al., 2014; Ghahramani, 2015). Recent
sampling methods considered to be efficient are used to
explore the posterior distribution of the proposed model.
Initial sampling was performed using an approximate
method, known as automatic differentiation variational
inference (ADVI) (Kucukelbir et al., 2015). Final sam-
pling used an exact Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method, known as the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC);
in particular, the No-U-Turn Sampler (NUTS) (Hoffman
and Gelman, 2014) was used. Bayesian optimization
(Brochu et al., 2010; Emaasit and Paz, 2018) was used
to tune the hyperparameters.
Code and data for the experiments described
in the next section are available on GitHub at
https://github.com/emaasit/long-range-extrapolation.
3 EXPERIMENTS
3.1 INSIDER THREAT
3.1.1 Raw data and sample formation
The insider-threat data used for empirical analysis in
this study was provided by the computer emergency re-
sponse team (CERT) division of the software engineer-
ing institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University (CERT-
Division). The data, referred to as the ”Insider Threat
Tools dataset”, is a synthetic test dataset generated by
Glasser and Lindauer (2013) that represents a fictitious
company with employees and features such as their com-
puters, files, removable media and websites they vis-
ited. Version ”r6.2.tar.bz2” of the dataset was used. The
particular insider threat focused on is the case where
a known insider sent information as email attachments
from their work email to their home email.
To obtain the sample for the current analysis, the dataset
was processed as follows. First, the data was filtered for
a known insider with userID ”CDE1846”. Second, only
emails sent by the insider outside the company organi-
zation were filtered. Third, the email-attachment size
in Gigabytes was summarized into a monthly sum re-
sulting into a sample size of 14 months ranging from
2010-01-31 to 2011-02-28. Table 1 shows a compari-
son of descriptive statistics between emails sent to a per-
sonal account versus a non-personal account. The size of
emails sent outside the company organization is shown
to be smaller than amount sent within. Finally, emails
sent to the insider’s personal email account (”Ewing-
Carlos@comcast.net”) were filtered as shown in Figure
1. This was the final sample used for analysis. It is diffi-
cult to tell any noticeable trends in this small sample size
of 14.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for monthly-attachment-
size of emails in GB sent by a known insider outside the
organization.
STATISTIC
EMAIL DESTINATION
Personal account Non-personal
Mean 3.84 37.52
Std Dev 2.28 13.38
Min 0.18 10.56
Max 7.96 57.78
Count 14 14
3.1.2 Empirical Analysis
The first eleven data points shown in blue in Figure 1
were used for training and the last three data points in red
for testing. An appropriate number of terms in the sum,
Q, was set to 10 as proposed by Wilson et al. (2015) re-
sulting in 10 frequency parameters and 10 length-scale
parameters. A maximum number of 30 iterations was
chosen to tune the 20 hyperparameters for the optimized
GP-SM. An ARIMA model was estimated using the
Figure 1: Monthly-attachment-size of emails in GB sent
by a known insider to a personal account.
methodology proposed by Veeramisti (2016) for compar-
ison.
Figure 2 shows the results of the three estimated mod-
els. Figure 2a shows that the Gaussian process model
with a spectral mixture kernel is able to capture the struc-
ture implicitly both in regions of the training and test-
ing data. The 95% predicted credible interval (CI) con-
tains the true size of email attachments for the duration
of the measurements. Furthermore, the C.I are much
narrower than the other two models. Figure 2b shows
that the Gaussian process model with the hyperparame-
ters of the spectral mixture kernel tuned using Bayesian
optimization is also able to capture structure implicitly.
The predictive performance is especially better in the re-
gion of the training data where the predicted data points
entirely overlap with the training data. Performance in
the region of testing data is comparable to the standard
model. This finding suggests that hyperparameter tuning
for small data without easily noticeable structure does
not produce any significant model improvement. Figure
2c shows that ARIMA model is not able to capture the
structure within the region of training data. This finding
suggests that ARIMA models have poor performance for
small data without noticeable structure. The 95% confi-
dence interval for ARIMA is much wider than both the
GP models showing a high degree of uncertaininty about
the ARIMA predictions.
Table 2 shows the performance measures for the three
estimated models including the root mean square error
(RMSE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE).
The GP-SM model had the best predictive performance
of 1.25 for RMSE and 27.96% for MAPE. The GP-SM
optimized model had a fairly similar predictive perfor-
mance of 1.29 for RMSE and 28.80% for the MAPE. The
(a) GP-SM (b) GP-SM Optimized
(c) ARIMA (d) Number of Iterations of Bayesian Optimization
Figure 2: Comparison of Gaussian process models with spectral mixture kernels to ARIMA models for emails.
estimated ARIMA model had the worst predictive per-
formance of 3.20 for RMSE and 93.44% for the MAPE.
These findings suggest that hyperparameter tuning for
small data produces models of comparable performance.
If parameter tuning takes a considerable amount of time,
then it may not be necessarily to use if it does not pro-
duce any significant model improvement.
Table 2: Performance measures for the three different
models on email data
MODEL
MEASURE
RMSE MAPE
GP-SM 1.25 27.96%
GP-SM Optimized 1.29 28.80%
ARIMA 3.20 93.44%
3.2 HIGHWAY SAFETY
3.2.1 Raw data and sample formation
The highway-crash data used for empirical analysis in
this study was provided by the Nevada Department of
Transportation (NDOT). This data consists of two types
of crash severity including the annual number of fatalities
and serious injuries standardized over an exposure vari-
able called vehicle miles traveled (VMT). Vehicle miles
traveled represents the total annual miles of vehicle travel
divided by the total population in a state. Data for this in-
dicator is provided by the Highway Statistics division of
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) (FHWA).
Data for fatal crashes and serious injuries were available
from 1996 to 2004 and from 1995 to 2003, respectively.
The final samples used for the current analysis include
time-series of annual fatalities per 100 million VMT and
annual serious injuries per 100 million VMT resulting
in small sample sizes of 20 and 21 respectively. Ta-
ble 3 provides descriptive statistics of these time-series.
Given that NDOT only collects these crash counts annu-
(a) Number of fatal crashes per 100 million VMT (b) Number of serious injuries per 100 million VMT
Figure 3: Number of fatal and serious injury crashes per 100 million vehicle miles travel.
ally (Veeramisti, 2016), they lack seasonality as shown in
Figure 3. The first 17 and 16 data points shown in blue in
Figure 3a and Figure 3b were used for training, respec-
tively. The remaining four data points shown in red were
used for testing.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for highway crashes per
100 million VMT in Nevada
STATISTIC
CRASH TYPE
Fatalities Serious injuries
Mean 1.69 12.82
Std Dev 0.43 3.99
Min 1.02 6.63
Max 2.24 20.97
Count 21 20
3.2.2 Empirical Analysis
An appropriate number of terms in the sum, Q, was set
to 10 as proposed by Wilson et al. (2015) resulting in
10 frequency parameters and 10 length-scale parame-
ters. A maximum number of 30 iterations was chosen to
tune the 20 hyperparameters for the optimized GP-SM.
An ARIMA model was estimated using the methodology
proposed by Veeramisti (2016) for comparison.
Figure 4 shows the results of the three estimated models
for annual fatal crashes per 100M VMT. Figure 4a shows
that the Gaussian process model with a spectral mixture
kernel is able to capture the structure implicitly both in
regions of the training and testing data. The 95% pre-
dicted credible interval (CI) contains the true number of
annual fatalities per 100M VMT albeit that they are are
much wider than the other two models. Figure 4b shows
that the Gaussian process model with the hyperparame-
ters of the spectral mixture kernel tuned using Bayesian
optimization is also able to capture structure implicitly.
The predictive performance is especially better in the re-
gion of the training data where the predicted data points
entirely overlap with the training data. Predictive per-
formance on testing data is poorer than the standard
model. This finding suggests that hyperparameter tuning
for small data without easily noticeable structure does
not produce any significant model improvement. Figure
4c shows that ARIMA model is not able to capture the
structure within the region of testing data. This finding
suggests that ARIMA models have poor performance for
small data without noticeable structure. The 95% confi-
dence interval for ARIMA is much wider than both the
GP models showing a high degree of uncertaininty about
the ARIMA predictions.
Figure 5 shows the results of the three estimated mod-
els for annual serious injuries per 100M VMT. Figure 5a
shows that the Gaussian process model with a spectral
mixture kernel is able to capture the structure implicitly
both in regions of the training and testing data. The 95%
predicted credible interval (CI) contains the true number
of annual serious injuries per 100M VMT. The C.I are
much wider than the other two models. Figure 5b shows
that the Gaussian process model with the hyperparame-
ters of the spectral mixture kernel tuned using Bayesian
optimization is also able to capture structure implicitly.
The predictive performance is especially better in the re-
gion of the training data where the predicted data points
entirely overlap with the training data. Predictive per-
formance in the region of testing data is poorer com-
pared to the standard model. This finding suggests that
hyperparameter tuning for small data without easily no-
(a) GP-SM for fatalities (b) GP-SM Optimized for fatalities
(c) ARIMA for fatalities (d) Number of Iterations in Optimization for fatalities
Figure 4: Comparison of Gaussian process models with spectral mixture kernels to ARIMA for fatal crashes.
ticeable structure does not produce any significant model
improvement. Figure 5c shows that ARIMA model was
also able to capture the structure within the region of
testing data. This finding suggests that ARIMA mod-
els have good performance for time-series that have eas-
ily noticeable structure. The 95% confidence interval for
ARIMA is comparable narrower than the standard GP
model showing a lesser degree of uncertainty about the
ARIMA predictions.
Table 2 shows the performance measures for the three
estimated models including the root mean square error
(RMSE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE).
The GP-SM model had the best predictive performance
of 1.25 for RMSE and 27.96% for MAPE. The GP-SM
optimized model had a fairly similar predictive perfor-
mance of 1.29 for RMSE and 28.80% for the MAPE. The
estimated ARIMA model had the worst predictive per-
formance of 3.20 for RMSE and 93.44% for the MAPE.
These findings suggest that hyperparameter tunning for
small data produces models of comparable performance.
If parameter tuning takes a considerable amount of time,
then it may not be necessarily to use if it does not pro-
duce any significant model improvement.
Table 4: Performance measures for the three different
models on highway crashes per 100 million VMT
MODEL
FATALITIES INJURIES
RMSE MAPE RMSE MAPE
GP-SM 0.06 3.31% 0.87 11.5%
GP-SM Opt 0.24 14.00% 2.69 34.37%
ARIMA 0.34 27.07% 1.68 17.72%
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
This paper proposed a Bayesian nonparametric frame-
work to capture implicitly hidden structure in time-series
having limited data. The proposed framework, a Gaus-
sian process with a spectral mixture kernel, was ap-
plied to time-series process for insider-threat detection
and highway-safety planning. The proposed framework
(a) GP-SM for serious injuries (b) GP-SM Optimized for serious injuries
(c) ARIMA for serious injuries (d) Number of Iterations in Optimization for serious injuries
Figure 5: Comparison of Gaussian process models with spectral mixture kernels to ARIMA for serious injuries.
addresses two current challenges when analyzing quite
noisy time-series having limited data whereby the time
series are visualized for noticeable structure such as pe-
riodicity, growing or decreasing trends and hard coding
them into pre-specified functional forms. Experiments
demonstrated that results from this framework outper-
form traditional ARIMA when the time series does not
have easily noticeable structure and is quite noisy. Future
work will involve evaluating the proposed framework on
other different types of insider-threat behavior.
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